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  11.   INTRODUCTION 
 
 
One of the important economic arguments in favor of the equitable distribution of farmland is 
that smaller farms are more productive. A large portion of the economic development literature 
is devoted to this topic, with arguments going both for and against the notion that smaller farms 
are more productive. This essay, on the relationship between farm size and productivity, builds 
on the study J. Mohan Rao and I completed for the UNDP and Ministerio de Hacienda del 
Paraguay (Masterson and Rao 1999). This essay departs from the earlier work, using more 
recent data, allowing for comparison between two time periods, and by employing both 
stochastic and nonparametric techniques for generating technical efficiency measurements, an 
alternative to the factor productivity measures used in the original study. In addition, while the 
prior report was driven by the search for policy proposals to promote economic growth, this 
essay will focus on the inverse relationship itself. The results of the original paper support the 
hypothesis that farm size and productivity are inversely proportional in Paraguay. This result 
holds even taking into account the various other factors in the literature on the inverse 
relationship between farm size and productivity, such as land quality, Green Revolution 
technology, and supervision costs.  
One critique leveled at the literature on the productivity-farm size relationship is that the 
measure used, land productivity, is inappropriate. Because it only compares total output to the 
size of the farm, ignoring other factors of production and inputs, land productivity is said to be, 
at best, an incomplete measure of economic efficiency. This study will address this issue in the 
Paraguayan context. Small farms have both higher land productivity and equal or better 
technical efficiency. This is true even when controlling for many of the factors the literature 
suggests as possible explanations for the inverse relationship. I will now discuss the literature on 
the farm size productivity relationship briefly, before moving on to review the data and the 









  22.    LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Study of India’s Farm Management Surveys sparked a debate in the 1960s on an observed 
inverse relationship between farm size and productivity (Sen 1962). Inputs, costs, and output per 
hectare seemed to decrease as farm size increased, while output per unit of input increased. 
Debates raged over whether this was due to differential factor prices, differential land use 
intensities (cropping and inputs), qualitative factor differences, class-based differences among 
farms of different sizes, or some combination of factors. The implications of these findings for 
agrarian reform added a great deal of fuel to the fire. Higher factor use intensities on small farms 
were clearly a phenomenon that demanded study (Mazumdar 1965; Dyer 1991). 
The debate and the studies it provoked produced interesting findings and conclusions. It was 
found that there is an inverse relationship between total output divided by net cropped area and 
farm size, and that using gross cropped area reduces the strength of this relationship. The search 
for an inverse relationship for physical yield of individual crops yielded weak evidence, but a 
strong inverse relationship between cropping intensity and farm size was found. Inverse 
relationships were found between labor intensity and farm size, between family labor and farm 
size, between capital input intensity and farm size, but not between intermediate inputs and farm 
size. And an inverse relationship between percentage of land irrigated and farm size was 
discovered. The observed inverse relationship was not due to differences in factor endowments 
(soil, labor, management ability, etc.), but to higher land use and cropping intensities. While 
differential factor prices, property rights, and tenure play a part in this phenomenon, the inverse 
relationship reflects “the desperate struggle of poor and marginal peasants to scratch a bare 
subsistence” (Dyer 1991). This Indian debate sparked many similar debates and studies in the 
rest of the world, in which many explanations have been proffered for the inverse relationship, 
some by those advocating for land reform and others by those who question its wisdom. 
Carter (1984) sets out many of the possible explanations for the observed inverse 
relationship. Village-specific factors might be correlated to farm size (such as the Malthusian 
argument that greater land quality would lead to greater population density). Then there are 
possible characteristics of small farms themselves: they may have better quality soil within 
villages; size may be a proxy for mode of production; there may be diminishing returns to scale; 
they may be more technically efficient. This section will review the literature for each proposed 
explanation of the inverse relationship. 
  3Production conditions in developing countries seem to have certain characteristics in 
common: a bimodal production structure (large farms with lots of unused land and small farms 
with excess labor); capitalist relations of production are less prevalent than in industrialized 
nations; in some areas, markets in the means of production are controlled by rich landowners 
(Cornia 1985). Do these conditions contribute to the inverse relationship? Ajit Kumar Ghose 
(1979) investigates the contribution of the organization of production to the observed inverse 
relationship in Indian agriculture. He classifies farms along two axes, ownership and labor. 
Peasant farms are those on which family labor makes up fifty percent or more of the total labor 
employed in production. Tenant farms are those which lease or rent at least some of the land 
they operate. He finds that the intensity of labor, as well as other inputs, varies inversely with 
farm size for all types (combinations of ownership and labor) of farm. He finds that an inverse 
relationship does exist between farm size and output per acre for all farms in most samples, for 
peasant tenant and peasant owner farms in most samples, and employer farms. Ghose concludes 
that small farms’ allocative efficiency is due not to the superiority of peasant organization of 
production, but relies on primitive technology and undeveloped markets: in the absence of labor-
saving technologies and developed markets in inputs (such as fertilizer) and labor, small farms, 
with abundant labor and the use of farmyard manure, have the advantage. But Ghose 
hypothesized that this advantage would disappear with technological progress. 
Many authors conclude that the inverse relationship is a result of differential factor use 
intensity (Carter 1984; Newell, Pandya, and Symons 1997). In a 1996 study typical of this 
approach, Byiringiro and Reardon find that small Rwandan farms achieve three times greater 
land yields, use four times more labor, and have four times the number of plots per hectare that 
larger farms do. They conclude that as a result of this, small farms have greater average and 
marginal productivity of land and are less allocatively efficient. The question of the source of 
this differentiated use of factors (especially family labor) is often attributed to imperfect labor 
markets (i.e., lack of off-farm employment opportunities [Verma and Bromley 1987]). This is 
one of the most well-developed areas of the overall inverse relationship literature. 
One proposed explanation of high labor use intensities on small farms is that in the land 
market, smaller peasants face higher effective purchase prices for land. This skewed resource 
position for smaller farmers has several implications about their use of labor vis-à-vis larger 
farmers: they use labor more intensively for each crop; they use more of the available land; they 
choose more labor-intensive crops; and they use their own labor for land improvements. All of 
  4these implications lead to the conclusion that small farmers have a higher resource use per unit 
of land. This factor use intensity gives small farms a productivity advantage over large farms, 
but with the advent of green revolution technology, they might lose this advantage, since, in the 
absence of technical extension and credit services, small farmers do not have access to these 
technologies (Cornia 1985). 
Another explanation for the greater intensity of family labor among small peasants is 
desperation. If small farmers are struggling at the edge of survival, they are more likely to work 
hard. It would not be prudent to equate the welfare of the small peasant household with its 
productivity, if that productivity is the result of poverty.
1  
Dualistic labor markets have also been proposed as an explanation—if family labor is 
cheaper, then there should be a higher labor to land ratio on the smaller farms. There are logical 
economic reasons for a gap between the supply prices of family and hired labor. There is less 
uncertainty about effort with family labor than with hired labor, making the opportunity cost for 
family labor lower (Mazumdar 1965). In addition, workers may prefer to work for themselves, 
or at least for their own family, than to work for someone else (Sen 1975). The control large 
landowners have, over factor markets especially, means that different size farms face different 
factor prices: for small farms, land and capital are more expensive than for large farms, while 
labor is less expensive. This leads to excess labor supply in the labor market, which would imply 
that wages in agriculture will tend towards zero. This is not observed, however, since the wage 
will not drop below some “minimum caloric requirement.” Large farms will hire labor only until 
the marginal product of labor is equal to this minimum wage. Thus, there will be unemployed 
labor and the opportunity cost of employing family labor will be low on small farms (Verma and 
Bromley 1987; Cornia 1985). 
Such labor market theories of the high family labor use of small farms and its contribution to 
the inverse relationship have relied on labor market dualism, but the fact remains that small 
farmers both hire in and hire out labor (though this is not to say that they are perfect substitutes; 
for more on that, see below). In addition, hired labor is necessary on larger farms, so family 
labor is an unlikely explanation for the inverse relationship between fifteen and fifty acres, for 
example. Thus, it is important not to go too far in identifying farm size with characteristics such 
as capitalization, mechanization, and use of wage labor (Dyer 1996). Feder (1985) offers an 
                                                 
1I am grateful to Vamsicharan Vakulabharanam for his observations. 
  5alternative explanation of the more intense use of family labor, based on three propositions: first, 
that family labor is more efficient than supervised labor; second, that family labor is more 
motivated than hired labor and can supervise the latter; and third, that the supply of working 
capital is directly related to farm size. 
The greater efficiency of family labor on small farms may be due to two factors. First, as the 
ratio of hired to family labor rises, supervision becomes more time consuming and less effective. 
Second, as the social distance between the supervisors and the hired labor increases (as it would 
on larger farms), the effectiveness of supervision will decrease (Boyce 1987). 
Another common refrain is that, due to the stochastic effects of weather and so forth on 
agricultural output, farmers cannot use output to monitor the effort of employees. Thus, farm 
wage labor requires supervision. This results in the inverse relationship (the larger the farm, the 
thinner the family labor is spread, the greater the monitoring problems), as well as the structure 
of agrarian land and labor contracts, and the adoption of labor saving technology by larger 
farms. In his study, Frisvold (1994) determines that family and hired labor are not perfect 
substitutes. While the source of differential family labor use among farm sizes will not be 
examined in this study, its effects on productivity will be. 
Neoclassical theorists argue that the segmentation of land, credit, and labor markets results in 
the inverse relationship. Large landowners have access to land and credit that small farmers do 
not. However, this segmentation implies that larger farms are more capital intensive, which 
should theoretically decrease the inverse relationship (Dyer 1996). While larger farms generally 
have higher land-to-labor and capital-to-labor ratios, they do not necessarily have higher capital-
to-land ratios. If the capital-to-land ratio is higher for large farms, then the inverse relationship is 
weakened. In 1991, larger farms did indeed have higher capital to land ratios in Paraguay 
(Masterson and Rao 1999). Carter and Wiebe (1990) argue that small farms’ hyperproductivity 
is eventually overwhelmed by capital constraints—as farm size increases, it becomes less easy to 
substitute family labor for hired labor and other purchased inputs. Since credit markets in many 
less-developed countries are characterized by undeveloped financial institutions (meaning local 
money lenders making high interest rate loans to small farmers, while lower interest rate, 
“institutional” credit goes to the richer peasants), the cost of and access to credit are inversely 
related to farm size (Cornia 1985). This credit market segmentation favors the reduction of the 
inverse relationship. Labor market segmentation, on the other hand, may intensify the inverse 
  6relationship. Segmentation in input markets may also tend to diminish the inverse relationship if 
larger farmers have first access to tractors, etc. 
Land quality differences may contribute to the inverse relationship. More output may lead to 
greater population growth in areas with greater land quality, which could lead to greater 
fragmentation and, thus, smaller farms. Land quality differences have two possible sources: 
natural differences in soil types, climate, etc.; and man-made differences, due to investments in 
fertilizers, soil conservation, etc. In the latter case, small farm size could lead to better quality 
land, not the other way around. Smaller farms may be more likely to make labor-intensive 
investments in soil quality.
2  Bhalla and Roy (1988) argue that, if land quality and farm size are 
inversely correlated and farm size and cultivated area are directly correlated, then excluding land 
quality from regressions of land yields on cultivated area would bias the estimated coefficient of 
cultivated area downward. But this would be bias only if the soil quality differences were not 
due to investments made by farmers themselves. Thus, agro-climatic conditions and soil quality, 
crucial determinants of agricultural productivity, as well as measures of farmers’ investments in 
soil quality must be included in investigations of said productivity.  
Attempts to incorporate soil quality into empirical investigations of the inverse relationship 
have met with mixed results. Newell, Pandyal, and Symons (1997) argue that, in Gujarat, farms 
are smaller in fertile regions than in less fertile regions, so that output per hectare is larger on 
small farms. Benjamin (1995) tests land quality’s contribution to the inverse relationship with 
inconclusive results—land quality may be a factor. He does not examine labor market effects, 
due to data limitations, but argues that local labor market conditions should remove the effect 
via cluster fixed effects. Carter (1984), on the other hand, finds that while land quality explains 
some of the inverse relationship, it does not explain all of it. Both natural soil quality and 
investments in soil quality must contribute to productivity, so I will test that contribution. 
While decreasing returns to scale would explain the inverse relationship, evidence of 
constant returns to scale is widespread, even after the introduction of green revolution 
technology (Carter 1984). Constant returns to scale implies that there is no technological basis 
for the inverse relationship, but does not rule out scale related price differentials (Feder 1985). 
Increasing complexity and supervision/incentive problems may contribute to diseconomies of 
scale, but if technical economies of scale exist, they could dominate organizational diseconomies 
  7(Dyer 1996). A. B. Deolalikar (1981), in another study on Indian agriculture, investigates the 
inverse relationship geographically and finds that the inverse relationship holds for the 
traditional sector, but concludes that the green revolution, where it has taken hold, has wiped out 
the inverse relationship. 
The work of anthropologist Sol Tax in Mayan communities in Guatemala is the basis for a 
major Latin American version of this debate: the “efficient but poor” hypothesis put forward by 
Schultz in his seminal 1964 study of Guatemalan Indian villages. The two main contributions of 
Schultz’s work were: that low income levels among indigenous/peasant communities were the 
result of the low productivity of the available inputs and not due to allocative inefficiency by 
individual peasant farmers; and that outside experts could not improve productivity simply by 
suggesting reallocation of existing resources. Education was needed to facilitate new, higher 
productivity factors of production. Schultz’s real contribution was in pointing out that peasants 
are more than willing to respond to changing incentives. Schultz’s analysis employed a 
particular type of long-run economic equilibrium pertaining to peasant economy. Constant 
technology, preferences, and motives had been in place long enough for peasants to optimize at 
the margin. Thus, the low marginal product of labor led to the observed “idleness” of peasants, 
and low rate of return to savings to “lack of thrift.” The implication is that the “efficient but 
poor” hypothesis seems to be contradicted in changing conditions or imperfect markets. But for 
Schultz, it was responsiveness that leads to efficiency. Outside experts, though, can valuably 
advise on the use of new technologies (Ball and Pounder 1996). 
The risks involved in agriculture can be expected to affect the behavior of both small and 
large farmers. Given a lack of crop insurance markets and an unequal distribution of land, food 
price risk will result in the hyperexploitation of household labor on smaller farms (Barrett 1996). 
Larger farmers (who presumably have options smaller farmers don’t) will substitute away from 
farming to less risky options. In a context of imperfect land and/or credit markets, this will lead 
to underutilization of land by large farms. This combination, or either effect separately, will 




                                                                                                                                                             
2These investments are also dependent on tenure security—a short-term renter is unlikely to invest labor on soil 
improvements. 
  83.  DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
The work in this study will be done using the 2000–2001 MECOVI dataset, as well as soil 
quality data that I obtained from the Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganaderia (MAG) of Paraguay 
in the summer of 1998. The Mejoramiento de las Encuestas de Hogares y la Medición de 
Condiciones de Vida (MECOVI) dataset is a Living Standards Measurement Survey, following 
the World Bank’s LSMS guidelines. It includes data on a sample of 8131 representative 
Paraguayan households, including demographic data for each household member, data on 
individual land ownership, data on land controlled in various forms of tenancy, data on the usage 
of land, and detailed output and price data for crops, livestock, dairy, and processed goods. 
Using these data, I am able to calculate the total value of agricultural output for each farm 
household. I am also able to derive a number of interesting and useful bits of information for use 
as explanatory variables, as described below. Additional notes on data are contained in 
Appendix A. 
In the UNDP study, we used a variety of models to examine productivity in Paraguay. We 
ran regressions of land, labor, and capital productivity, as well as the three factor ratios 
(land/labor, land/capital, capital/labor) using a variety of determinants, including household size, 
age, education and sex of the household head, ratio of family to total labor, soil quality, use of 
green revolution technologies and soil conservation techniques, and access to credit and 
technical assistance. In addition, we created a new measure of efficiency, “relative efficiency,” 
by running a log-normal production function regression and dividing the actual output values by 
the resulting predicted values. Unfortunately, the relative efficiency measure did not vary 
enough among farms to be useful for measuring differences (Masterson and Rao 1999). 
What measure of productivity to use is certainly an open question. Most studies have used 
either a production function approach or used land productivity (aggregate output divided by 
farm size). This measure is subject to criticism as giving too much importance to one input, land. 
In the Paraguayan context of extremely high land concentration and high rates of rural poverty, a 
focus on land is appropriate. However, I will examine efficiency as well, since another critique 
of the use of land productivity is that it is not an accurate measure of actual efficiency. Thus, this 
paper will focus on two measures: land productivity (the subject of the inverse relationship 
literature) and technical efficiency.  
  9I use two methods for deriving the technical efficiency measure. Both are production frontier 
techniques. One is a nonparametric technique—data envelopment analysis. The second is a 
regression technique, a stochastic production frontier. I’ll now explain each in turn.  
The data envelopment analysis method I employ,
3 unlike the stochastic method of frontier 
estimation, has the advantage of not imposing a functional form on the production data. In 
addition, this technique, unlike the stochastic method described below, allows for multiple 


























Where xij is the amount of input i for farm j, yrj is the amount of output r from farm j, and jo is 
the farm to be assessed. The objective variable φ measures the technical efficiency of farm jo. 
The two slack variables, S
+
i  and S
-
r, measure slack in inputs and outputs, respectively. This linear 
programming model fits an n-dimensional (in this case n=10: 6 inputs plus 4 outputs) envelope 
around the data and determines each farm’s distance from it. This distance gives a measure of 
each farm’s technical efficiency relative to every other farm, a desirable characteristic.  
The stochastic production frontier method uses a regression specification of the following 
general model:  
 
  yi=βxi+νi-ui (2) 
 
                                                 
3Following the work of Fletschner and Zepeda (1998) and others: Chavas and Aliber 1993; Banker, Charmes, and 
Cooper 1984; and Emrouznejad 2004. 
  10in which yi is the total production of farm i, xi is a vector of inputs for farm i, β is a vector of 
coefficients, ni is a randomly distributed error term for each farm i, and ui is a one-sided 
(positive only) inefficiency error term (Aigner and Chu 1968). The specification I use is as 
follows:  
 
  yi=β1AreaOpi+β2Fami+β3Hiredi+β4Rentali+β5Depi+β6Inputsi+νi-ui,   (3) 
 
where y is the net value of farm production in millions of Guaranies,
4  AreaOp is the operational 
area of the farm (the farm’s size, in hectares), Fam is the family labor employed on the farm (in 
person years), Hired is the hired labor employed on the farm (in person years), Rental is the 
resources rented by the farm (in millions G), Dep is the depreciation of the capital stock of the 
farm (in millions G), and Inputs are the inputs used by the farm in production (in millions G). By 
estimating this model, we can derive a technical efficiency measure by comparing the actual 
output with the predicted output for each farm.
5  So, both methods base a measure of technical 
efficiency on the distance of each farm from a production frontier generated using all the farms 
in the sample.  
I regress the land productivity (net farm income divided by farm size, a value that is much 
more straightforward to arrive at) and the technical efficiency measures on household 
characteristics, farm characteristics, farm management factors, and regional factors. There are a 
number of important household characteristics that I will include. The gender, age, and 
education of the household heads are the first and foremost of these. I expect age and education 
to increase land productivity and technical efficiency, since knowledge and experience should 
improve farming ability. The sexes of the household head and of landowners are included. The 
sex of the household head dummy variables are female_head and male_head. These two 
variables account for all the single-headed households. The most numerous group, the dual-
headed households are left as the control case. The sex of landowners is represented by FLR, a 
dummy variable that takes the value of one if there is a female landowner in the household. 
These measures can capture the effects of gender on productivity and efficiency. Since these 
                                                 
4During the period of the MECOVI survey, one US$ exchanged for an average of 3,685 Guaranies (hereafter simply 
G). 
5Stata version 8 provides a procedure called “frontier” to accomplish this. 
  11effects can include both bias against women in input and output markets, and actual differences 
in allocating resources among farm production options, their impact on productivity and 
efficiency is difficult to predict, and, once arrived at, to interpret.  
The farm characteristics I use include both the operational area and the area owned by the 
household (Binswanger, Deininger, and Feder 1995), household size, an index of tenure 
security,
6 an index of the mode of production,
7 and assets. Farm management characteristics 
include the receipt of credit, technical, and marketing assistance. Regional factors include the 
zone (see Appendix A) and the district-level soil quality index (see Appendix A). 
 
4.    MEASURING TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY 
 
Table 1 contains the summary statistics for the variables used in the stochastic and 
nonparametric frontier estimates. The average total farm output for 2,885 rural farm households 
was 13.99 million G (about $3,682). Of this total, most (9.63 million G, or 68.8%) was from 
crops, with the balance made up of cattle (1.52 million G, or 10.9%) and dairy income (2.17 
million G, or 15.5%). Processing accounted for only an average of 670 thousand G (4.8%). The 
average farm size was 17.46 hectares, while the average farm household owned 9.21 hectares of 
land. Farms used, on average, 1.79 person years in family labor, while spending about 510 
thousand G per year on hired help. Farms’ rental of nonlabor resources averaged 490 thousand G 
annually, while their depreciation averaged 3.31 million G. Finally input costs averaged 3.3 
million G per year. 
I ran the linear programming model, using crop, cattle, dairy, and processed as outputs and 
operated land, hired labor, family labor, depreciation, resource rental, and agricultural inputs
8 as 
inputs, using the linear program in Equation 1, above.
9  I call the resulting measure 
nonparametric technical efficiency, eff1. Its mean is 0.22, which seems somewhat low for an 
average technical efficiency. 
                                                 
6I derive the tenure security index by assigning a security value for each type of tenure (1, the highest for owned, 
titled land, etc.) and taking the average of the tenure security value for each farm, weighted by the share of the total 
operated area of each farm under the various farms of tenure. 
7The mode index is constructed by taking the family labor employed in agriculture on the farm and dividing by the 
sum of family and hired labor employed on the farm. Thus, if mode=1, the farm uses family labor only, and if 
mode=0, the farm uses hired labor only. 
8Fertilizers, pesticides, dietary supplements, and the like, aggregated by amount spent on each item. 
9The SAS statistical software package includes a linear programming procedure. The SAS program for creating the 
technical efficiency measure is a slight modification of the program provided by Ali Emrouznejad SASDEA. 
  12I estimated six separate specifications of a stochastic production frontier using total output y 
as the dependent variable, the same set of six inputs as the nonparametric model (see footnote 4). 
The specifications I use are, in order: linear, quadratic, and log in the dependent variables, for y 
and then lny. All six regressions yielded significant results. The built-in technical efficiency 
diagnostic of this STATA module provides a new variable containing the estimated technical 
efficiency for each observation in the regression estimation. I call the resulting variables, seff1 
through seff6, stochastic technical efficiency. Interestingly, the means of seff1-seff3 are quite 
high (0.95) and their standard deviations are very close to zero. This quality makes these 
variables unattractive choices for dependent variables, since there is little variation to explain. It 
also appears that they are not very good measures of technical efficiency, unless we believe that 
all farms are quite efficient and quite similar. I do not. Thus, seff4-seff6 are likelier candidates. 
Of the latter three regressions, the last (log-log model) yielded the strongest result (highest χ
2). 
The resulting variable, seff6, also has a higher mean than the rest of the estimates. I report the 
result of this regression in Table 2, below. Now that I have all of my dependent variables in 
hand, I move on to explaining the variations among rural farm households. 
 
 
5.    EXPLAINING PRODUCTIVITY AND EFFICIENCY 
 
 
I now examine each of three measures of productivity or efficiency: land productivity, LP (total 
value of farm output divided by farm size), and the two technical efficiency (stochastic technical 
efficiency, seff, and nonparametric technical efficiency, eff) measures, the derivation of which 
was described in the previous section. For each, I attempt to explain variations by farm size, 
controlling for other factors. First, notice that the land productivity measure clearly shows a 
tendency to decrease with farm size. See Figure 1, which graphs the result of a nonparametric 
regression of the log of land productivity on the log of farm size. The relationship between farm 
size and the stochastic technical efficiency measure is similar, though not as clear (Figure 3). 
The relationship between farm size and nonparametric technical efficiency is U-shaped (see 
Figure 2). The following descriptive statistical analysis by farm size will shed some more light 
on these relationships before I test them with regression analysis. 
First, I present the descriptive statistics for all of the dependent and independent variables I 
use in the regression analysis (Table 3). For the sample as a whole, the average area owned is 9.9 
  13hectares, while the average area operated is 16.7 hectares. The average farm had a tenure 
security index of 0.8. The average farm had a forty-four year old female head and a forty-eight 
year old male head, each of whom had five years of education. Twelve percent of households 
were headed by a single female and 10% were headed by a single male. Women owned land in 
only 7.8% of households. The average household had five members. The average farm had 
productive assets worth 26 million G. Seven percent of farms received technical assistance, 10% 
received credit assistance, and less than one percent received marketing assistance. The average 
farm used family labor almost exclusively (the mode of production index for the average farm 
was 0.96). The average soil quality was 0.4. None of the farms in the sample were in the Chaco 
region (because I have no soil quality data for that sparsely populated part of the country).  
Dividing up the farms in the sample according to size categories (based on operated area, or 
farm size), we can see that land is quite unequally distributed among rural farms (see Table 4). 
Of the 2,492 farms, 277 operate less than one hectare, 721 operate between one and five 
hectares, and another 539 operate between five and ten hectares. Thus, 61.7% of farms operate 
on less than ten hectares, which is still short of the overall average of 16.7 hectares!  The very 
smallest farms enjoy the highest land productivity (13.7 million G per hectare), labor to land 
ratios (18.1 person years per hectare, see Table 6), and capital to land ratio (1.7 billion G per 
hectare). Land productivity drops steadily as we move into larger farm size categories, until 
farms larger than 50 hectares, after which land productivity rises slightly (though the three 
largest farms have more than double the land productivity that the farms in the 50 to 100 hectare 
range do). The smallest farms (those with farms less than 10 hectares in size) operated a total of 
831 thousand hectares, which accounts for only 13.1% of the total land operated by farms in the 
survey, and they owned 13.7% of the total land owned (see Table 5). The labor to land and 
capital to land ratios fall steadily as the farm size increases, until leveling off for farms above 50 
hectares, then increasing slightly for the largest farms (in the case of the labor/land ratio only, 
see Table 6). Clearly, smaller farms are engaged in more intensive use of their land. This is an 
intuitive result, since households with limited access to productive resources are under great 
pressure to use everything they have in order to survive. This intensity no doubt is the source of 
the land productivity advantage small farms have.  
This advantage does not carry over into either of the technical efficiency measures that I use 
here. In Table 7, we see that there is a slow decrease in the nonparametric measure among the 
smaller farms (below 50 hectares), after which, technical efficiency increases. The stochastic 
  14measure increases through the smaller farm size categories, peaks in the 5 to 10 hectare range, 
and then falls fairly slowly. The farms in the largest farm size category have the highest average 
stochastic efficiency measure at .551. Are these patterns due in fact to farm size (or something 
related to farm size)? The following regression analysis will shed light on this question. 
I first present five specifications of a land productivity model, in Table 8.
10  The full 










in which LP is land productivity (in millions of G per hectare), AreaOperated is farm size (in 
hectares), tenure is the tenure security index, FemaleYears is years of education of the female 
head of household, FemaleAge is age of the female head of household, MaleYears is years of 
education of the male head of household, MaleAge is age of the female head of household, 
female_head is a dummy variable for households with single female heads, male_head is a 
dummy variable for households with single male heads, FLR is a dummy variable for 
households with female landownership, hhsize is the number of members in the household, 
Assets is the amount of productive assets owned by the household in millions of G, tech_ass is a 
dummy variable for households that have received technical assistance, cred_ass is a dummy 
variable for households that have received credit assistance, mkt_ass is a dummy variable for 
households that have received marketing assistance, mode is the mode of production index as 
described above, soil_quality is the soil quality index, and central, colonizacion, and frontera are 
the regional dummy variables. I begin with a simple regression of land productivity on farm size, 
the basic model of the literature on the inverse relationship (column 1), and then step by step add 
in the factors that others were unable to control for (columns 2 through 5). In the basic model, 
the inverse relationship between farm size and land productivity holds (and conforms to the 
descriptive analysis above): the coefficient on the log of operated area (logAreaOP) is negative 
                                                 
10I test for multicollinearity using variance inflation factors. 
  15and significant.
11  In the next model, I include the soil quality index. Much has been made of the 
possibility that soil quality might explain the relationship between land productivity and farm 
size. But, though soil quality is, predictably, both positive and significant, the impact of farm 
size on land productivity is unchanged. In fact, it is slightly higher!  
The next model presented includes the tenure security index. This addition does not affect 
the impacts of farm size or soil quality on land productivity. Tenure security is estimated to 
significantly increase land productivity. Next I add the mode of production index.
12  Mode is 
estimated to decrease land productivity, though this is not a significant result. So, the more a 
farm operates like an independent family farm, the lower land productivity that farm will enjoy. 
Since the farm’s size is still estimated to decrease land productivity, the relatively more intensive 
use of family labor cannot be the source of small farms’ land productivity advantage. In 
addition, inclusion of the mode index changes the sign of the tenure security index. When I 
complete the model, adding in the influence of the demographic, gender, economic, regional, 
and assistance variables, we see that the sign and significance of farm size and soil quality 
remain unchanged. So these estimated impacts seem to be robust. However, higher tenure 
security is now estimated to reduce land productivity, though not significantly, while higher 
levels of family labor now significantly reduce land productivity. Female- and male-headed 
households are estimated to have significantly lower land productivity.
13  Additional years of the 
female head’s education are estimated to have a significant positive impact on land productivity. 
Female land rights’ impact is positive, though not significant. Household size and assets 
significantly increase land productivity. Both technical and credit assistance significantly 
increase land productivity, as well. Finally, farms in the central region have significantly lower 
land productivity. 
Since both of the technical efficiency measures are bounded at zero and one, we must use 
Tobit rather than Ordinary Least Squares to estimate coefficients. Tobit analysis applies 
maximum likelihood estimation to dependent variables that are censored. The resulting 
estimated coefficients have properties similar to OLS estimated coefficients, if the sample size is 
sufficiently large. The sample size in this analysis is large enough to allow interpretation of the 
                                                 
11By significant, I mean statistically different from zero at least the 90% confidence level when referring to 
estimated coefficients from this point forward, unless otherwise specified 
12Mode is defined as the ratio of family labor to hired plus family labor. Thus, it is the portion of total farm labor 
represented by family labor, and takes on the value of one for a family farm that hires no labor and zero for a purely 
capitalist farm. 
  16estimates as though they were OLS estimates. Unfortunately, there are no easy methods to assess 
the relative merits of different specifications with Tobit analysis. I compare c
2 statistics for lack 
of a better method. In both cases, the quadratic-log model gave the best results. The results of 
the Tobit regressions of the technical efficiency measures appear in Tables 9 and 10. 
First, turning our attention to the nonparametric technical efficiency measure (Table 9), we 
see that the area operated significantly reduces efficiency, but the quadratic turn is significantly 
positive, so, as we observed in Figure 2, efficiency falls with size for smaller farms, but rises for 
larger farms. Both female and male household heads have significantly lower technical 
efficiency. More educated male and female heads significantly increase technical efficiency, as 
do older male heads. Female land rights are estimated to lower efficiency, but not significantly. 
Smaller household size significantly contributes to technical efficiency, while higher shares of 
family labor reduce it. Greater household assets, as well as soil quality, have significant positive 
impacts on technical efficiency. 
Turning next to the regression of the stochastic efficiency measure seff (Table 10), we notice 
that technical efficiency decreases slightly, but significantly, with farm size. The quadratic term 
in this regression is positive, so we expect that efficiency drops off faster with larger than 
smaller farms. Again this confirms the visual observation in Figure 3. The effect of tenure 
security is significantly negative in this case. Technical efficiency increases significantly with 
female heads’ years of education and age. Again, both female- and male-headed households are 
significantly less efficient than dual-headed households. The amount of physical capital, the 
household size, and soil quality also contribute significantly to increased technical efficiency. 
In all three measures, we see significant declines with farm size for smaller farms, while for 
larger farms nonparametric technical efficiency increases with farm size. Clearly we are talking 
about two different modes of production. Many of these larger farms are the mechanized, 
capitalist farms found in the frontier zone. This pattern has policy implications, which I turn to 





                                                                                                                                                             
13This is in comparison to dual-headed households, the default category. 
  176.   CONCLUSION 
 
Several interesting conclusions come out of this study. First, this essay provides a cautionary tale 
about methodology. The fact that the stochastic and the nonparametric methods employed to 
estimate farms’ technical efficiency produced quite different results stands as a warning to 
anyone attempting to use either one separately. Although there was significant correlation 
between the two, their relationships to farm size (the variable of interest here) were quite 
different. Each method has its advantages and disadvantages, but using both together may be the 
best approach to take in any study of this sort. 
The impact of tenure security is an interesting phenomenon—it was estimated to decrease 
land productivity and technical efficiency. However, in the thinner models (with just tenure and 
farm size, for example), tenure appeared to have a significant positive impact on land 
productivity. This result suggests that titling, the wunderkind of mainstream policy proposals, is 
not so clearly beneficial and that its supposed benefits may be based on a combination of theory 
and incomplete empirical analysis. In theory, titling is supposed to improve farm productivity by 
providing secure collateral for input loans. Better credit terms means more and better inputs and 
so, better productivity. But my results suggest otherwise. This analysis does not tell us why 
better tenure security should lead to lower productivity and efficiency. Definitive answers to this 
question will have to await more detailed research. 
Another consistent result of this study is that rising shares of household labor employed in 
agriculture result in lower productivity and efficiency. This is in opposition to theory on this 
point—that household labor requires less supervision and is more motivated than hired labor, 
and so should be more productive and efficient. The share of family labor in total labor is 
significantly negatively correlated with both the amount of physical capital and the amount of 
land owned by the household. These possible indirect effects are controlled for in the regression 
analysis (in the form of the Assets variable, which had significantly positive impacts on both 
productivity and efficiency). Another possible explanation is that there is a process of selection 
happening, with households’ “better” farmers opting to hire themselves out, rather than working 
on the farm. This makes sense if the wages they can earn are higher than the returns to working 
on their own farm. 
  18Another important contribution is in terms of gender—its impact on productivity and 
efficiency amounts to nothing. Female land rights were never significant in their impact on 
productivity or efficiency. Both types of single-headed households are at a disadvantage, both in 
terms of productivity and efficiency, with single male-headed households being slightly worse 
off in terms of efficiency. So there is no evidence in this study that there are significant 
productivity or efficiency differences between men and women. 
Finally, this study’s most important contribution to the continuing debate over the 
relationship between productivity and farm size is an affirmation of the inverse relationship in 
the case of Paraguay. Of the three measures I have used, the first, land productivity, is 
significantly greater for smaller farms (especially the very smallest farms). This result confirms 
earlier work using the 1991 agricultural census (Masterson and Rao 1999). The analysis of the 
two technical efficiency measures does little to disabuse us of the notion that smaller farms are 
more efficient or productive. The nonparametric technical efficiency measure decreased 
significantly with farm size, among small farms. Those farms (with less than 50 hectares 
operated) amounted to all but 123 of the 2,676 farms in the sample. The stochastic efficiency 
measure decreased significantly with farm size for the whole sample. At the very least, the 
policy conclusion to be drawn from these results is that policies favorable to large-scale farms in 
Paraguay may foment overall growth in the agricultural sector, but they will do less than nothing 
to combat the problem of rural poverty. They will contribute neither to the well being of small 
farmers nor to employment opportunities for landless peasants, since the larger farms are so 
capital intensive.  
It is no stretch to say that the argument for redistribution of land is bolstered by this study. 
Giving land to smaller farms will increase overall production, as well as improve the welfare of 
the small and landless peasantry. The questions of how to achieve this goal can and will be 
addressed elsewhere.  
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Figure 1: Land Productivity and Farm Size 
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Figure 2: Nonparametric Technical Efficiency and Farm Size 
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  22 TABLES 
 
Table 1:  Summary Statistics for Stochastic Frontier Regression Variables 
 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Total Farm Income 
(millions G) 
13.99 100.61 
Crop income (millions G)  9.63  98.69 
Cattle income (millions G)  1.52  5.69 




Operated area (Has.)  17.46  183.55 
Owned area (Has.)  9.21  45.02 
Family labor (Person 
Years) 
1.79 1.31 
Hired labor (millions G)  0.51  4.82 
Resource rental (millions 
G) 
0.49 6.45 
Depreciation (millions G)  3.31  11.18 
Input costs (millions G)  3.3  49.37 
N 2885 











  23Table 2:  Stochastic Frontier Regression 6  
 
Variable  Coefficient  (Std. Err.) 
Equation 1 : lny 
logAreaOP  0.545** (0.001) 
logFam  0.064** (0.002) 
logHired  0.033** (0.001) 
logRental  0.045** (0.001) 
logDep  0.002** (0.001) 
logInputs  0.123** (0.001) 
Intercept  2.266** (0.005) 
Equation 2 : lnsig2v 
Intercept  -0.806** (0.005) 
Equation 3 : lnsig2u 





















  24Table 3:  Summary Statistics for Regression Variables  
 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  N 
Land productivity 
(millions G/Ha.) 
3.38 15.48 2492 
Nonparametric 
Tech. Eff. 
0.22 0.22 2492 
Stochastic Tech. 
Eff. 
0.46 0.17 2492 
Area Owned (Has.) 9.89  46.31  2492 
Area Operated 
(Has.) 
16.67 80.17 2492 
Tenure Security 
Index 
0.8 0.24  2492 
Female Years of 
Education 
4.82 2.87 1935 
Female Age  43.93  15.3  2267 
Male Years of 
Education 
4.93 3.09 1963 
Male Age  47.7  14.94  2182 
Female-Headed 
Household (%) 
12.31 32.86 2492 
Male-Headed 
Household (%) 
10.03 30.05 2492 
Female Land Rights 
(%) 
7.77 26.77 2492 
Household Size  5.21  2.7  2492 
Assets (millions G) 26.02  93.35  2492 
Technical 
Assistance (%) 
7.29 26 2492 
Credit Assistance 
(%) 
9.56 29.41 2492 
Marketing 
Assistance (%) 
0.83 9.1 2492 
Mode of Production  0.96  0.15  2492 
Soil Quality Index  0.4  0.21  2492 
Central Region (%)  30.4  46.01  2492 
Colonization 
Region (%) 
24.86 43.23 2492 
Minifundia Region 
(%) 
16.01 36.67 2492 
Frontier Region (%)  28.74  45.26  2492 
Chaco Region (%)  0  0  2492 
 Source: MECOVI 2001 
 
  25Table 4: Number of Farms and Average Land Productivity (millions G/Ha.) by Farm Size 
 
Farm Size Category   Nm e a n
Less than 1 ha.  277 13.7
>=1 to <5 ha.  721 2.04
>=5 to <10 ha.  539 1.31
>=10 to <20 ha.  567 1.01
>=20 to <50 ha.  260 .812
>=50 to <100 ha.  66 .598
>=100 to <200 ha.  28 .642
>=200 to <500 ha.  18 .639
>=500 to <1000 ha.  12 .642
>=1000 ha.  4 1.35
Total 2492 3.38
Source: MECOVI 2001  
 
Table 5: Total Area Operated and Owned (Hectares) by Farm Size 
 
Farm Size Category   Area Operated Area Owned
Less than 1 ha.  13763.83 5540.02
>=1 to <5 ha.  255901.82 121581.12
>=5 to <10 ha.  561689.25 387811.21
>=10 to <20 ha.  991521.50 770082.13
>=20 to <50 ha.  898675.40 696843.65
>=50 to <100 ha.  529546.40 416583.75
>=100 to <200 ha.  387915.74 227037.24
>=200 to <500 ha.  619211.30 310481.50
>=500 to <1000 ha.  1175271.00 681831.52
>=1000 ha.  921388.00 152800.00
Total 6354884.25 3770592.14






  26Table 6: Average Labor-Land Ratio (Person Years/Ha.) and Capital-Land Ratio (millions 
G/Ha.) by Farm Size 
 
Farm Size Category   Labor/Land Capital/Land
Less than 1 ha.  18.07 1565.64
>=1 to <5 ha.  0.93 6.07
>=5 to <10 ha.  0.36 0.97
>=10 to <20 ha.  0.19 0.64
>=20 to <50 ha.  0.12 0.56
>=50 to <100 ha.  0.05 0.66
>=100 to <200 ha.  0.03 0.58
>=200 to <500 ha.  0.03 0.65
>=500 to <1000 ha.  0.02 0.66
>=1000 ha.  0.07 0.63
Total 3.32 255.94
Source: MECOVI 2001  
 
Table 7: Average Stochastic Technical Efficiency and Nonparametric Technical Efficiency 
by Farm Size 
 
Farm Size Category   Nonparametric Stochastic
Less than 1 ha.  0.272 0.447
>=1 to <5 ha.  0.210 0.468
>=5 to <10 ha.  0.182 0.485
>=10 to <20 ha.  0.194 0.470
>=20 to <50 ha.  0.190 0.432
>=50 to <100 ha.  0.272 0.437
>=100 to <200 ha.  0.410 0.420
>=200 to <500 ha.  0.563 0.449
>=500 to <1000 ha.  0.564 0.402
>=1000 ha.  0.799 0.578
Total 0.216 0.464






  27Table 8:  Survey Regression of Land Productivity  
 
Variable  Coefficient  (Std. Err.) 
logAreaOP  -0.386** (0.031) 




F (1,323)   156.667**
 
Source: MECOVI 2001 
  
 
Table 9:  Survey Regression of Land Productivity  
 
Variable  Coefficient  (Std. Err.) 
logAreaOP  -0.392** (0.030) 
soil_quality  0.881** (0.136) 




F (2,323)   87.044**
 








  28Table 10:  Survey Regression of Land Productivity  
 
Variable  Coefficient  (Std. Err.) 
logAreaOP  -0.403** (0.030) 
tenure  0.427** (0.140) 
soil_quality  0.845** (0.135) 




F (3,323)   64.477**
 
Source: MECOVI 2001 
  
 
Table 11:  Survey Regression of Land Productivity  
 
Variable  Coefficient  (Std. Err.) 
logAreaOP  -0.406** (0.029) 
tenure  0.424** (0.140) 
mode -0.222  (0.221) 
soil_quality  0.844** (0.136) 




F (4,323)   53.471**
 






  29Table 12:  Survey Regression of Land Productivity  
 
Variable  Coefficient  (Std. Err.) 
logAreaOP  -0.477** (0.031) 
tenure -0.236  (0.170) 
logFemaleYears  0.131† (0.068) 
logFemaleAge 0.198  (0.208) 
logMaleYears 0.018  (0.055) 
logMaleAge 0.108  (0.285) 
female_head  -0.277** (0.095) 
male_head  -0.268* (0.124) 
FLR 0.073  (0.123) 
hhsize  0.035** (0.009) 
logAssets  0.130** (0.034) 
tech_ass_recvd  0.181* (0.089) 
cred_ass_recvd  0.248** (0.076) 
mkt_ass_recvd 0.159  (0.208) 
mode  -0.330† (0.189) 
soil_quality  0.603** (0.155) 
central  -0.283** (0.100) 
colonizacion 0.086  (0.083) 
frontera -0.041  (0.086) 




F (19,323)   20.858**
 







  30Table 13:  Tobit Regression of Nonparametric Technical Efficiency Measure  
 
Variable  Coefficient  (Std. Err.) 
logAreaOP  -0.026** (0.003) 
logAOPSQR  0.009** (0.001) 
tenure  -0.126** (0.022) 
logFemaleYears  0.022* (0.009) 
logFemaleAge -0.011  (0.021) 
logMaleYears  0.020* (0.009) 
logMaleAge  0.069** (0.023) 
female_head  -0.029† (0.016) 
male_head  -0.059** (0.015) 
FLR -0.011  (0.018) 
hhsize  -0.008** (0.002) 
logAssets  0.009** (0.002) 
tech_ass_recvd -0.006  (0.019) 
cred_ass_recvd -0.008  (0.016) 
mkt_ass_recvd 0.070  (0.049) 
mode  -0.055† (0.030) 
soil_quality  0.053* (0.026) 
central  -0.072** (0.014) 
colonizacion  0.024† (0.014) 
frontera -0.023  (0.015) 
Intercept  0.397** (0.038) 




F (20,2472)   315.847**
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Table 14:  Tobit Regression of Stochastic Technical Efficiency Measure  
 
Variable  Coefficient  (Std. Err.) 
logAreaOP  -0.011** (0.002) 
logAOPSQR  -0.002** (0.001) 
tenure  -0.039* (0.017) 
logFemaleYears  0.012† (0.007) 
logFemaleAge  0.033* (0.016) 
logMaleYears 0.005  (0.007) 
logMaleAge 0.024  (0.017) 
female_head  -0.039** (0.012) 
male_head  -0.046** (0.012) 
FLR 0.004  (0.014) 
hhsize  0.006** (0.001) 
logAssets  0.017** (0.002) 
tech_ass_recvd 0.007  (0.014) 
cred_ass_recvd 0.003  (0.012) 
mkt_ass_recvd 0.048  (0.037) 
mode 0.019  (0.023) 
soil_quality  0.075** (0.020) 
central  -0.070** (0.011) 
colonizacion 0.013  (0.011) 
frontera  -0.024* (0.012) 
Intercept  0.454** (0.029) 




F (20,2472)   274.8**
 
Source: MECOVI 2001 
  
  32 APPENDIX 
 
Data 
The sources of the data for this dissertation are the following. First, the 1991 Censo 
Agropecuario, carried out by the Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería (MAG) of the 
government of Paraguay. The second is a listing of soil types and quality for each district of 
Paraguay, furnished by MAG. The third is a list of prices for agricultural products and capital 
equipment, obtained directly from MAG and from a 1991 MAG publication entitled Costos de 
Producción. The fourth and final data set is the MECOVI (Living Standards Measurement 
Survey) carried out by MAG in 2000–2001, and obtained for use in the World Bank project. 
1.   Regions 
The Departamentos of Paraguay can be categorized into regions based on the history of agrarian 
policy and development, as well as geography and climate. The Central region, centered on 
Asunción, is the oldest region settled by Europeans in the country and is the most thickly settled 
area today. The departamentos that belong to this region are: Central, Cordillera, and Guairá. 
The farms in this region are, for the most part, quite small. Excess labor is absorbed into the 
urban informal and industrial sectors. The next region is characterized by the 
minifundia/latifundia pattern of agrarian structure, with many small farms and relatively few 
very large farms, and by long term European occupation. The Minifundia region includes the 
departamentos of Paraguarí, Caazapá, Concepción, Misiones, and Ñeembucú. The next region is 
similar in structure to the Minifundia zone. The difference is that this region was settled under 
the colonization policy of the 1960s. The Colonización region includes San Pedro and Caaguazú. 
The Minifundia and Colonización zones are characterized by intense land conflicts. The 
agricultural frontier region is characterized by both immigration from Brazil, Argentina, 
Germany, and Japan, as well as by highly mechanized capitalist agriculture. It is also the scene 
of the greatest peasant differentiation, the highest land rents, least nonfarm employment 
opportunities, and, as a result of these pressures, the most intense struggles over land. The 
Frontera zone includes Alto Paraná, Amambay, Canindeyú, and Itapúa. The final region is the 
arid western half of the country, the Chaco. The Chaco includes Alto Paraguay, Boquerón, 
Chaco, Nueva Asunción, and Presidente Hayes (Carter and Galeano 1995). 
  332.   Soil Quality 
The soil quality index I will use in these papers is one I obtained from MAG in 1998. It includes, 
for most of the districts of the country, a comprehensive list of soil types found in the district, 
the percent of that district in which the soil type is found, and an index of that soil type’s quality. 
I generate my soil quality index by taking a weighted average of the soil quality index for each 
district:  
 
  QD= ∑ PDTQT (5) 
 
where QD is the soil quality index for the district, PDT is the percentage of a district’s land area 
of a particular soil type, and QT is the quality of that soil type. The resulting index is a number 
between zero and one, with higher values indicating a greater average soil quality for that 
district. 
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